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NOTES 
WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO "THE RIGHT TO KNOW"?: 
ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED INFORMATION 
SINCE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS 
The "right to know" has long been a rallying cry for those claiming a 
right of access to government-controlled information. l From the Freedom 
of Information Committee's campaign against government secrecy during 
the McCarthy era,2 to the efforts of "Nader's Raiders" to obtain records 
from recalcitrant agencies in the 1960's,3 to present-day calls for greater 
openness in the Reagan administration;' the "right to know" has continu-
ally been invoked to support demands for government information. De-
spite the vigor of the rhetoric it inspired, however, for many years the 
right went without any judicial acknowledgment of its existence. Indeed, 
the United States Supreme Court repeatedly rejected claims of a consti-
tutional right of access to government-controlled information. Ii 
Then, in the 1980 watershed case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia,S the Supreme Court recognized the public's right of access to 
criminal trials.7 Many commentators hailed this right as the beginning of 
a general "right to know,"8 while others predicted that this right would 
1 See, e.g., J. Carter, Freedom to Know (1974); H. Cross, The People's Right to Know 
(1953). 
• See H. Cross, supra note 1, at xiv-xv. 
• See E. Cox, R. Fellmeth & J. Schulz, "The Nader Report" on the Federal Trade Com-
mission (1969). 
• See, e.g., Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 22. 
• See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
• 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
7 Court members themselves recognized the importance of this decision. Justice Stevens 
stated, "This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute 
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely 
held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection 
whatsoever." Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
• See, e.g, Note, Public Trials and a First Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of 
Openness, 60 Neb. L. Rev. 169, 197-99 (1980); Note, A Foot in the Government's 
Door-Access Rights of the Press and Public: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 12 U. 
Tol. L. Rev. 991, 992-94, 1025-26 (1980); see also The SUpreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv. 
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not extend beyond the criminal courtroom.9 Seven years later, neither 
forecast has been fully horne out. Although the Supreme Court has de-
cided a number of right of access cases since Richmond Newspapers,lo it 
has never explicitly recognized this right outside criminal proceedings. 
State and lower federal courts, however, have found rights of access in a 
variety of contexts.11 
The purpose of this Note is to examine the present state of the right of 
access to government-controlled information. Part I begins by looking at 
the constitutional basis of the right of access and at the Supreme Court's 
gradual acceptance of the principle. It then turns to a discussion of Rich-
mond Newspapers and its progeny, focusing on the development of two 
alternative standards for evaluating right of access claims. The Supreme 
Court's two-prong test recognizes a right of access only when there is a 
tradition of openness surrounding the information in question, and when 
the access contributes to the functioning of the process involved. Under 
the balancing test, the right exists whenever the public's interest in ob-
taining access outweighs the government's interest in denying it. 
Part II briefly summarizes the treatment of the right of access by state 
and lower federal courts. Part II then describes the courts' application of 
the alternative standards and the effect of their decisions on the scope of 
the right of access. 
Drawing largely from the lessons of lower court experience, Part III 
evaluates the two right of access standards. Part III shows that the "two-
prong" test is seriously flawed, for it both abandons the Court's estab-
lished approach to first amendment adjudication and bears little relation 
to the underlying rationale for the right of access. The balancing test bet-
ter captures the purpose of the right of access, but creates a risk of ad hoc 
policymaking by courts. The Note concludes that this problem can be 
overcome by allowing both the legislature and the judiciary to assume 
roles in the balancing process. 
L. Rev. 77, 149, 155-59 (1980) (suggesting that Richmond Newspapers would give rise to a 
variety of access claims outside the criminal context). 
• See, e.g., Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in 
the Burger Court, 94 Harv. L. Rev. I, 20-24 (1980); Note, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia: A Demarcation of Access, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 937, 950-57 (1980); Recent Devel-
opment, 26 Viii. L. Rev. 183, 204 (1980). 
10 See infra notes 66-96 and accompanying text. 
II See infra notes 105-65 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE "RIGHT TO KNOW" 
A. The Constitutional Basis for a Right of Access 
1113 
The "right to know" can ultimately be traced to the widely accepted 
principle that the core value protected by the first amendment12 is the 
citizen's right to participate in America's representative democracy.13 Ac-
cording to this "political" theory of the first amendment, often associated 
with Professor Alexander Meiklejohn,14 freedom of speech is a necessary 
corollary of the American system of self-government. 111 Because voters 
govern the nation, it is vital that they have access to information on the 
matters they decide. Restricting information would prevent voters from 
understanding the issues before them, and would lead to "ill-considered, 
ill-balanced" results, threatening the welfare of the nation.16 Meiklejohn 
therefore argued that the core purpose of the first amendment is to pro-
tect the free flow of information,17 so as to give every voter "the fullest 
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which 
the citizens of a self-governing society must deal."18 
Although Meiklejohn did not extend his analysis beyond freedom of 
speech, his use of this political theory provides considerable support for 
the right of access to government information.19 The right of access in-
volves the acquisition of information, without which dissemination to the 
public would, of course, be impossible. To meet the core objective of in-
formed self-government, the first amendment must do more than protect 
channels of communication from government restraint. It must also en-
sure a right of access, so that relevant information is available to flow 
through those channels to the voters.20 
.2 U.S. Const. amend. I . 
.. See BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional 
Principle, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 482, 501-02 (1980) . 
.. See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948). This book 
is generally regarded as the seminal work on the link between the first amendment and self-
government. See BeVier, supra note 13, at 502 n.80 . 
.. See A. Meiklejohn, supra note 14, at 26-27. 
'0 Id. 
17 It should be noted that this led Meiklejohn to the conclusion that only "political 
speech" was protected by the first amendment. See id. at 44-46, 94; W. Francois, Mass Me-
dia Law and Regulation 20 (1975). Because this Note concerns only government-controlled 
information, which almost always fits into the category of "political speech," the distinction 
between political and non-political speech is not important for this discussion. 
's A. Meiklejohn, supra note 14, at 88. 
'" See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 14-20. 
2. Excellent examples of this line of reasoning can be found in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
438 U.S. 1, 30-33 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 
U.S. 843, 862-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court first recognized the fundamental link between the 
first amendment and self-government in Grosjean v. American Press 
CO.21 On that occasion, the Court stated that the first amendment was 
intended to protect "such free and general discussion of public matters as 
seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise 
of their rights as citizens."22 The Court has since relied on this political 
theory to protect the dissemination of information from prior restraint,23 
criminal punishment,24 and civil damages.25 The theory has also been in-
strumental in the Court's recognition of a "right to receive" informa-
tion,26 a right that has been extended to personal correspondence,27 politi-
cal28 and religious29 material, commercial information,ao pornography,al 
and information and ideas generally.32 Thus, the Supreme Court has used 
the political theory to protect "both ends of the flow of information."33 
The Court, however, was initially less receptive to the right to acquire 
information. In 1965, addressing its first right of access claim,a4 the Court 
declared that "[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the 
unrestrained right to gather information."35 Although the Court an-
nounced in 1972 that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment 
protections,"36 it soon became apparent that this protection did not in-
clude a right of access to government-controlled information. In 1974, in 
21 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
22 Id. at 249-50 (quoting 2 T. Cooley, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 
1927». 
23 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
24 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978). 
2. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975). 
28 This "right to receive" bas also been referred to as the "right to know." The right to 
receive involves the receipt of information from willing sources, and so is distinguishable 
from the "right to know" discussed in this Note, which involves the right of access to infor-
mation in tbe hands of an unwilling source-the government. 
27 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
28 See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
29 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 
(1943). 
30 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
31 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("This right to receive information and 
ideas, regardless of their social worth ... is fundamental to our free society."). 
32 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
33 Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 109, 137 (1977). 
34 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the plaintiff argued that the government's 
ban on travel to Cuba violated the first amendment right of citizens to gather information 
on the effect of government policies. See id. at 16. 
3. Id. at 17. 
38 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). In Branzburg, the Court held that this 
protection did not extend to giving newsmen a constitutional privilege not to reveal confi-
dential sources and information before a grand jury. See id. at 709. 
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Pell v. Procunier37 and Saxbe v. Washington Post CO.,38 the Court re-
jected reporters' claims of a right of access to prisons to interview in-
mates. The court nonetheless dodged the "right to know" issue by hold-
ing only that the press had no greater access rights than the public 
generally.39 Four years after Pell and Saxbe, the Court again confronted 
the media's claim of a right to conduct inmate interviews. This time, in 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,40 both Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion 
and Justice Stewart's concurrence denied that the first amendment pro-
vided the press or the public with a right of access to government-con-
trolled information.41 
Meanwhile, however, the right of access principle was slowly gathering 
the support of the Court. In his Saxbe dissent, Justice Powell argued that 
the political objective of the first amendment required access to informa-
tion because "public debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be 
informed."42 This argument was later echoed by Justice Stevens' dissent 
in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.43 When the Court in 1979 held that neither 
the public nor the press had a sixth amendment right to attend criminal 
trials,44 Justice Powell stated that the right to attend trials should be rec-
ognized as a first amendment right "[b]ecause of the importance of the 
public's having accurate information concerning the operation of its crim-
inal justice system."4li The following year, in Richmond Newspapers, a 
majority of the Court recognized a first amendment right to attend crimi-
nal trials, and the right of access was born.46 
37 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
3. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
3. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Sax be, 417 U.S. at 850 . 
• 0 438 U.S. 1 (1978). In Houchins, reporters sought to bring television cameras ii~to a 
county jail. See id. at 3-4. 
<J See id. at 15 ("Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteentb Amendment man-
dates a right of access to government information .... "); id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring) 
("The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to 
information generated or controlled by government .... ") . 
• 2 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) . 
• 3 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-40 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
H See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The sixth amendment gives the 
accused a right to a "public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
•• Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring) . 
•• Specifically, the Court held that "[a)bsent an overriding interest articulated in find-
ings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980). For a more detailed discussion of the right of access cases 
preceding Richmond Newspapers, see Gunther, Constitutional Law 1439-45 (11th ed. 1985). 
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B. Richmond Newspapers and Its Progeny: The Development of a 
Right of Access Standard 
In Richmond Newspapers, seven members of the Court agreed that 
there was a first amendment right to attend criminal trials.47 However, 
because six of these Justices submitted separate opinions,48 the basis, op-
erant standards, and scope of this right of access were unclear. In a series 
of decisions following Richmond Newspapers, the Court reached a con-
sensus on the right's underlying rationale and fashioned a standard to 
determine when that right applies.49 
In his opinion announcing the judgment in Richmond Newspapers, 
Chief Justice Burger relied in part on the "political" theory of the first 
amendment.llo He explained that some right of access protection is needed 
if the first amendment is to fulfill its "core purpose" of providing infor-
mation on issues related "to the functioning of government."111 He found 
this to be especially true in the criminal trial context, because no aspect 
of government is "of higher concern and importance to the people than 
the manner in which criminal trials are conducted."112 The Chief Justice, 
however, did not rely solely on this political argument to justify the right 
of access. He also invoked what Justice Blackmun called a "veritable pot-
pourri"113 of constitutional guarantees, including the first amendment 
right of assembly,54 the ninth amendment/II and the "penumbra" of the 
Bill of Rights.1IS Underlying all of these, Chief Justice Burger said, is the 
"presumption of openness" of criminal trials resulting from the long his-
torical tradition of access to such proceedings.1I7 
.7 Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 604-06 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell did not participate in 
the case . 
•• See id. at 558-81 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring); 
id. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 598-601 
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) . 
•• See infra notes 66-96 and accompanying text. 
5. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-77. 
51 Id. at 575. 
5' Id. 
53 Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) . 
.. See id. at 577-78. Chief Justice Burger suggested that the trial courtroom could be 
considered a "public place." Id. at 578. 
55 See id. at 579 n.15. 
56 See id. at 579-80. Chief Justice Burger compared the right to attend criminal trials to 
such penumbral guarantees as the right of association and the right of privacy. See id. 
57 Id. at 573. Chief Justice Burger made much of the fact that a tradition of access to 
trials existed at English common law, and was firmly in place in this country at the time the 
Bill of Rights was adopted. See id. at 564-75. The Chief Justice relied on this factor to 
distinguish the earlier "right of access" cases, writing that Pelt and Saxbe were outside the 
Richmond Newspapers rationale" because "[plenal institutions do not share the long tradi-
tion of openness." Id. at 576 n.l1. 
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Of more lasting importance than the Chief Justice's opinion was the 
concurrence of Justice Brennan, which became the foundation for subse-
quent decisions in this area. Justice Brennan based the right of access to 
government-controlled information squarely on the political theory of the 
first amendment. He wrote that an informed citizenry is "necessary for a 
democracy to survive,"58 and that to ensure that information flows to the 
public, the first amendment must provide a right of access to government 
information. 59 Conceding that the scope of such a right is "theoretically 
endless,"6o Justice Brennan proposed "two helpful principles" to aid in 
setting practical limits on access rights.61 
First, Justice Brennan stated that a right of access claim is stronger 
where there is a tradition of openness to the particular proceeding or in-
formation at issue.62 Second, he proposed that access be granted when-
ever it furthers the functioning or purposes of the particular process in-
volved.63 He then found both of these factors to be present in the context 
of criminal trialS.64 Justice Brennan therefore concluded that only a 
"compelling" government interest could outweigh the right of access to 
trials.65 
The Court's next right of access case, decided in 1982, was Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court.66 Justice Brennan's majority opinion struck 
down a Massachusetts law requiring judges to exclude the press and the 
public from the courtroom during the testimony of minors who were al-
leged victims of a sex offense.67 Justice Brennan relied on his reasoning in 
Richmond Newspapers, stating that the right of access is grounded in the 
core first amendment purpose of ensuring that citizens can "effectively 
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-govern-
•• Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
•• See id. at 587·88. 
60 Id. at 588 (quoting Brennan, Address, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 (1979». Justice 
Brennan noted that the access right could be invoked not only to support demands for any 
and all sorts of government information, but to challenge virtually any government restric-
tion on private actions, because U[tlhere are few restrictions on action which could not be 
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." Id. (quoting Zemel v. 
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965». 
6. Id. at 589. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
6. Justice Brennan, like Chief Justice Burger, noted the long tradition of access to trials. 
See id. at 589-93. Regarding the value of access to the trial process, Justice Brennan said 
that access buttresses public confidence in the criminal justice system, restrains judicial 
abuse, and aids accurate factfinding. See id. at 593-97. 
6' Id. at 598. 
66 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
67 See id. at 610-11. 
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ment."68 Globe was the first case in which a majority of the Court ac-
cepted first amendment political theory as the basis for a right of access 
to government information. 
Justice Brennan also returned to the "two helpful principles" he had 
noted in Richmond Newspapers. He stated that the first amendment's 
protection of a right of access to criminal trials in particular is explained 
by the tradition of openness associated with the proceeding and by the 
contributions such access could make to the functioning of the criminal 
trial process.69 Justice Brennan's opinion indicated that the two princi-
ples, "tradition of openness" and "contribution to function," had been 
elevated from "helpful" concepts. Rather, the opinion implied, the princi-
ples were the bases or the necessary preconditions for a right of access to 
criminal trials. Indeed, after Globe, many lower courts began using "tra-
dition" and "contribution to function" as a two-pronged standard for de-
termining whether there was a right of access to government proceedings 
or information.70 
Other language in Justice Brennan's opinion, however, cast doubt on 
the importance of these two principles. The Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts argued in Globe that the requisite "tradition of openness" was not 
present in the case because criminal trials had historically been closed 
during the testimony of minors who were sex crime victims.71 Justice 
. Brennan rejected this argument, saying that access to a particular trial 
did not depend on the historical openness of the type of trial involved.72 
This, along with the explicit grounding of the right of access in first 
amendment political theory, led some courts to treat "tradition" and 
"contribution to function" as mere factors to be considered in evaluating 
right of access claims.73 Thus, the standard for determining when a right 
of access exists was still uncertain after Globe. 
The Globe decision did, however, establish the test for assessing gov-
ernment attempts to limit access rights where they do exist. Government 
restrictions are subject to the traditional first amendment "strict scru-
tiny" standard: the right of access could be outweighed only by a "com-
pelling governmental interest" and the denial had to be "narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest."74 The use of the strict scrutiny standard 
•• Id. at 604 . 
• s See id. at 605·06. 
10 See, e.g., cases discussed infra notes 103·37 and accompanying text. 
11 See Globe, 457 U.S. at 605 n.13. 
12 See id. 
13 See, e.g., cases discussed infra notes 138·65 and accompanying text . 
.. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606·07. Applying this standard to the statute at issue, Justice Bren-
nan found that the interest in protecting tbe wellbeing of a minor was compelling, but then 
found that a mandatory closure rule was too broad. See id. at 607-08. 
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underscored the Court's holding that the right of access is a first amend-
ment right. 
Two years later, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court75 (Press-
Enterprise l), the Supreme Court found a right of access to voir dire pro-
ceedings in a criminal case.76 This was the first time that the Court recog-
nized a right of access to a proceeding other than a criminal trial. The 
majority opinion did not discuss the constitutional basis of this right of 
access, but instead turned directly to the "tradition of openness" and 
"contribution to function" principles." After finding that both of these 
factors were present,78 the Court recognized a right of access to voir dire 
proceedings and declared that government attempts to deny this right 
had to meet Globe's strict scrutiny standard.79 
The majority's reference to "tradition" and "contribution to function" 
provided further confirmation of the importance of these factors.8o None-
theless, the opinion did not explicitly state that these two factors were 
prerequisites to a right of access. Indeed, evidence of historical tradition 
was referred to merely as "helpful" to that determination.81 This lent 
some support to lower court arguments that "tradition" and "contribu-
tion to function" were just two of the many factors to be weighed in eval-
uating a right of access claim.82 
The uncertainty left by Press-Enterprise I was exacerbated by Waller 
v. Georgia.83 In Waller, a unanimous Court found that a defendant's sixth 
amendment right to a public trial had been violated when a pretrial sup-
.. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
78 See id. at 504-05. 
77 This, in fact, probably prompted Justice Stevens' concurrence, in which Justice Stevens 
said that he wanted to "emphasize" the fact that the holding was based on the political 
theory of the first amendment. See id. at 516-19 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
78 Chief Justice Burger showed that there was a long history of public access to jury selec-
tion proceedings. See id. at 505-08. He then explained that access to voir dire contributed to 
the functioning of the criminal process because it enhanced "both the basic fairness of the 
criminal trial and tbe appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the sys-
tem." Id. at 508. Such confidence, he said, would be bolstered by public knowledge that 
criminals were being brought to account "by jurors fairly and openly selected." Id. at 509 . 
.. See id. at. 510. 
8. See Recent Case, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court: The Door Can Stay Closed 
'Til the Trial Begins, 13 W. St. U.L. Rev. 311, 318 (1985) ("[T]he Court's ... indulgence in 
historical review in Press-Enterprise I [leaves] little doubt as to the continued viability of 
the historical element."). 
8' Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505. 
8' See, e.g., In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1347 (1985) 
(Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court appears to have 
weighed historical practice as one factor among many in evaluating the appropriate scope of 
the right of access."). 
8. 467 U.S. 39 (1984). Waller was decided four months after Press-Enterprise 1. 
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pression hearing had been closed to the press and public.84 Although the 
Court did not rule on the petitioner's first amendment claim,85 the opin-
ion implied that there was a right of access to suppression hearings.86 Not 
only did this suggest an expansion of the right of access, it did so without 
discussing the "tradition of openness" factor that was so important in 
Globe and Press-Enterprise /.87 Justice Powell's opinion focused instead 
on the importance of the public interest in such hearings.88 Waller thus 
further confused the standard for evaluating right of access claims. 
In its latest "right to know" case, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court89 (Press-Enterprise II), the Supreme Court finally announced the 
definitive standard for determining whether there is a right of access to 
government-controlled information.90 The reviewing court must first de-
cide whether the "proceeding" to which access is sought meets the "tests 
of experience and logic."91 These tests are the two helpful principles that 
.4 See id. at. 43 . 
•• See id. at 47 n.6. 
8& Justice Powell's opinion relied on the Richmond Newspapers line of cases to establish 
that right, saying tbat "there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of 
the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of 
the press and public." Id. at 46. His opinion also noted that "[tlo the extent there is an 
independent public interest in the Sixth Amendment public-trial guarantee[,l ... it applies 
with full force to suppression hearings." Id. at 47 n.5. 
Two years after Waller, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 
106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986), the Supreme Court confirmed that Waller recognized a first amend-
ment right of access to suppression hearings: "[Iln Waller v. Georgia . .. [wle noted that 
the First Amendment right of access would in most instances attach to [suppression hear-
ingsl." Id. at 2740 . 
• 1 Nonetheless, Justice Powell's discussion of the importance of access to a fair trial was 
similar to the "contribution to function" factor that was applied in those cases. See Waller, 
467 U.S. at 45-47. 
88 See id . 
• 9 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986). In Press-Enterprise II, the Court held that the first amendment 
right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as they are conducted 
in California. See id. at 2743. 
00 Because of the central role of the "tradition" and "contribution to function" prongs in 
this standard, this Note will refer to it as the "two-prong" test. 
Not everyone, however, agrees that this is definitely the standard. In one federal circuit 
court decision made after Press-Enterprise II, the dissenters still insisted that the Supreme 
Court regarded historical practice as just a "relevant consideration" in weighing the govern-
ment's interest in closure against the access right. See Capital Cities Media v. Chester, 797 
F.2d 1164, 1189-90 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). As the majority in Capital Cities 
Media pointed out, however, the Supreme Court has made it quite clear that a tradition of 
openness is a requirement for a right of access. See id. at 1173-74 (detailing those instances 
in which the Court has noted the critical role of the tradition of access). 
01 Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. Ct. at 2741. The Court borrowed this language from Justice 
Brennan's opinion in Globe. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 
(1982). 
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Justice Brennan first suggested in Richmond Newspapers. There must be 
a tradition of access to the proceeding,92 and access must play "a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in ques-
tion."93 If the proceeding passes these tests, then a "qualified" first 
amendment right of access attaches.94 
Once there is a "qualified" right of access, the reviewing court must 
decide whether the government can restrict that right.95 To resolve this 
issue, the court applies the "strict scrutiny" test set out in Globe and 
Press-Enterprise 1. The right of access can only be restricted if it is out-
weighed hy an "overriding" government interest and if the denial of ac-
cess is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.9s 
One issue left unresolved by Press-Enterprise II is whether the right of 
access and the standard that defines it apply outside the context of crimi-
nal proceedings.97 Some language in the case suggests that the right of 
access can in fact extend to other areas. Although the majority opinion 
initially refers to the "First Amendment right of access to criminal pro-
ceedings,"98 it later fails to restrict its discussion to the criminal context. 
When introducing the right of access standard, the Court notes that "his-
tory and experience shape the functioning of governmental processes."99 
It also states that "[i]f the particular proceeding in question passes [the 
two-prong test], a qualified First Amendment right of public access at-
taches."loo The Court's reference to "governmental" proceedings and its 
failure to specify criminal proceedings when setting out the test imply 
that the right of access can be applied to government proceedings and 
information generally. 
More importantly, logic dictates that the right of access applies outside 
the context of criminal proceedings. If a right of access exists in criminal 
proceedings because they pass the tests of "tradition" and "contribution 
to function," then it is difficult to see how this right can be denied to 
other proceedings and information that also pass these tests. Justice Ste-
vens recognized this in his dissent in Press-Enterprise II, pointing out 
that "the logic of the Court's access right extends even beyond the con-
•• Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. Ct. at 2740 . 
• 3 rd. at 2740 . 
•• rd. at 274l. 
•• See id . 
•• rd. (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984}). 
n The Supreme Court has never recognized a right of access outside that sphere. Rich-
mond Newspapers and Globe both involved criminal trials, Press-Enterprise I involved voir 
dire proceedings, and Press-Enterprise II involved preliminary hearings . 
•• Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. Ct. at 2740 . 
•• rd. at 2741 (emphasis added). 
100 rd. 
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fines of the criminal justice system"101 and could apply to civil proceed-
ings and other forms of governmental information.102 
To a large extent, Justice Stevens' prophecy has already been fulfilled. 
State and lower federal courts have found rights of access to a variety of 
government proceedings and information. The next Part surveys these 
lower court decisions and outlines the present scope of the "right to 
know." 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE "RIGHT TO KNOW": THE RIGHT OF ACCESS IN THE 
LOWER COURTS 
Lower courts have taken divergent approaches in assessing the right of 
access to government-controlled information. A number of courts have ac-
cepted the "two-prong" test first suggested by Globe and then spelled out 
in Press-Enterprise 1[.1°3 These courts examine whether there is a tradi-
tion of openness to the information in question and whether access con-
tributes to the functioning of the process involved. If the claim clears 
these two hurdles, a right of access is recognized and government actions 
restricting it must meet the strict scrutiny standard. 
Meanwhile, other courts have used a "balancing" test to assess right of 
access claims. These courts have discounted the "history"and "contribu-
tion to function" prongs and have instead looked directly at the public 
interest in access to the information.l04 If the public's interest in ob-
taining access outweighs the government's interest in refusing to provide 
it, then a right of access is recognized. 
'0' Id. at 2751. 
'0' Indeed, Justice Stevens' dissent stated that "the ratio decidendi of today's decision 
knows no bounds." Id. Justice Stevens' dissent provides an interesting commentary on the 
present state of the law on the right of access. In Part I of his opinion, Justice Stevens 
reaffirmed his support for the right of access, relying on the "political" argument he had 
made in Houchins. See id. at 2744-47. Nevertheless, in Part II, Justice Stevens criticized the 
majority's decision extending the right in Press-Enterprise II. See id. at 2747-52. Justice 
Stevens' concern seems to have been that the "tradition" and "contribution to function" 
prongs would be ineffective as practical limits on the right of access, resulting in a very 
broad access right that could only be limited by restrictions tbat pass the "strict scrutiny" 
test. See id . 
• 03 For examples of cases applying the two-prong test, see infra notes 105-37 and accom-
panying text. 
'0< See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) ("the lack of an 
historic tradition ... does not bar ... a right of access"); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. 
Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 54 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Herald Co. v. Board of Parole, 131 Misc. 2d 36, 
45-46, 499 N.Y.S.2d 301, 308 (Sup. Ct. 1985). 
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A. Application of the "Two-Prong" Test 
Some courts have used the two-prong test to find a right of access in 
criminal justice areas not yet addressed by the Supreme Court. For exam-
ple, federal circuit courts have used this standard to find access rights to 
both criminal indictmentsl05 and postconviction proceedings.lo6 Similarly, 
the right of access has been extended beyond criminal proceedings them-
selves to the documents filed in those proceedings.lo7 
Courts have additionally relied on the two-prong test to establish a 
right of access to proceedings held "on the civil side of the docket."lo8 At 
least four federal circuits have recognized such a right.loP These courts 
'.5 See United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985). In Smith, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit showed that there has been a long common law 
tradition of public access to indictments. See id. at 1112. According to the Third Circuit, 
access to indictments contributes to the functioning of the trial process, because 
"[klnowledge of the ... charges is essential to an understanding of the trial, essential to an 
evaluation of the performance of counsel and the court, and most importantly, essential to 
an appraisal of the fairness of the criminal process to the accused." Id. 
10& See CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985). In CBS, Inc., 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit simply stated that tradition and 
contribution to function "apply with as much force to post-conviction proceedings as to the 
trial itself." Id. at 825. 
'.7 The leading case in this area is Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 
1143 (9th Cir. 1983). In Associated Press, the Ninth Circuit noted that there has historically 
been a common law right of access to most pretrial and trial documents. See id. at 1145. The 
function prong was satisfied because such documents are "often important to a full under-
standing of the way in which 'the judicial process and the government' as a whole are func-
tioning." Id. Other courts, following the lead of Associated Press, have also recognized such 
a right. See, e.g., CBS, Inc., 765 F.2d at 825 (right of access to documents in postconviction 
proceedings); United States v. Miller, 579 F. Supp. 862, 866 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (right of access 
to affidavit tapes). 
It should be noted, however, that the right of access to documents in a judicial proceeding 
is often viewed as a common law and not a constitutional law right. See, e.g., United States 
v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 576 (1985); United States v. 
Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Courts have concluded that Richmond Newspapers 
and its progeny do not overrule Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that members of the press had no first amendment right 
to copy tapes admitted as evidence in the Watergate trials. See id. at 608-11. The Nixon 
decision, however, was at least partly based on the fact that the press and the public had 
been able to listen to the tapes during the trial. Thus, the Nixon case posed the question of 
whether the right of access is limited to the right to attend, observe, and listen, or whether 
it extends to a right to copy records, to tape, or even to televise. That issue is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
I .. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2751 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
I •• See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984); In re 
Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
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noted the Supreme Court's emphasis on "tradition" and "contribution to 
function" in criminal cases,l1O and then found that these factors were sim-
ilarly present in civil proceedings.111 
The two-prong test has also been used, in contrast, to deny claims of 
access on both sides of the docket. In the criminal context, courts have 
used the "tradition" and "contribution to function" prongs to deny access 
rights to grand jury proceedings,1l2 proceedings to obtain corporeal evi-
dence,1l3 proceedings to determine whether a witness can testify,114 search 
warrants,115 and juvenile proceedings.116 With respect to civil proceedings, 
access has been denied to prejudgment records117 and civil settlement 
documents118 because the "tradition"119 and "function"120 prongs were 
found wanting. 
Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); see also 
Note, Public Access to Civil Court Records: A Common Law Approach, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 
1465, 1477-86 (1986) (indicating that four circuit courts have adopted a strong presumption 
in favor of access to civil court documents). 
110 See, e.g., Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1068; Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1178. 
1\1 For example, in Pub licker, the Third Circuit engaged in a lengthy discussion of Eng-
lish and American legal authorities to show that there was a long history of access to civil 
trials. See Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1068-69. The court then turned to the "contribution to 
function" factor, relying on authorities such as Holmes and Wigmore to show that public 
access to civil trials increased the quality of judicial administration, and increased public 
trust in the judicial system. See id. at 1069-70 (citing Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 
(1884»; 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 184 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976); see also Brown & William-
son, 710 F.2d at 1178-79 (suggesting that public access to civil trials permits community 
catharsis, promotes integrity, and discourages perjury). 
112 See In re Secretary of Labor Donovan, No. 81-2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 1986) (LEXIS, 
Genfed library, Cases file) (per curiam). The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit ruled that there was no right of access because grand jury proceedings 
had historically been closed to the public and access would "frustrate" rather than enhance 
the functioning of the grand jury process; see also In re Final Grand Jury Report, 197 Conn. 
698, 501 A.2d 377 (1985) (holding that "particularized need" standard permitted release of 
grand jury proceeding information to Department of Public Safety, but also holding that 
trial court had not abused its discretion in prohibiting release to newspapers). 
113 See Troy Publishing Co. v. Dwyer, 110 A.D.2d 327, 494 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1985). 
II< See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 80 Or. App. 754, 724 P.2d 822 (1986). 
1\0 See Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter, 105 Wash. 2d 144, 713 P.2d 710 (1986). 
118 See In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458, 438 A.2d 1125 (1981). 
\11 See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
In an opinion by then-Judge Scalia, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the reporters' 
challenge to a protective order by the trial court delaying until after trial and entry of judg-
ment the public's access to court records consisting of documents produced by and deposi-
tions given by the officers of plaintiff Mobil Oil Corporation. See id. at 1339. The appeals 
court also denied the reporters' claim of a right of access to materials used by the trial court 
in dismissing Mobil's motion for summary judgment, saying that there was no right of ac-
cess to "all documents consulted .•• by a court in ruling on pre-trial motions." Id. at 1338. 
118 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986). 
110 See Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d at 1336; Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at 205 . 
• 20 See Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d at 1337; Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at 205. 
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Judicial disciplinary proceedings represent yet another category to 
which the two-prong test has been applied.121 In First Amendment Coali-
tion v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Board,122 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit found no first amendment violation when a 
state constitutional provision permitted public access to Board records 
only when the Board recommended discipline. The court declared that in 
such disciplinary proceedings, "what tradition there is favors public ac-
cess only at a later stage in the process."123 It further noted that the con-
tribution to function question was taken into account by the state consti-
tutional convention and stated that "contribution to function" interests 
were adequately served by allowing access at a later stage.1U 
At least one court has used the two-prong test to find a right of access 
outside the judicial branch. In Society of Professional Journalists v. Sec-
retary of Labor,l2r> a federal district court found a first amendment right 
of access to administrative factfmding hearings.126 It stated that first 
amendment political theory applied in the administrative context12'1 and 
found that administrative hearings satisfied both the "tradition" and 
"contribution to function" prongs. The particular agency in question had 
regularly conducted closed hearings,l2S but the court found a tradition of 
openness in the brief history of administrative hearings as a whole.129 
"Contribution to function" existed because "openness ensures that [the 
agency] properly does its job."l30 Society of Professional Journalists thus 
demonstrates that extensive first amendment rights of access can be 
found under the two-prong test. 
121 These are adjudicatory hearings to determine whether judicial officers should be disci-
plined for misconduct. 
In 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986). 
123 Id. at 473. 
12. See id. at 474-75. 
I" 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985). 
128 See id. at 577. The hearing involved in the case was a Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration (MSHA) investigation into the cause of a coalmine fire that killed 27 miners. See 
id. at 570. 
127 The court maintained that administrative agencies should not have unfettered discre-
tion to close proceedings, for this interferes with the "public awareness and opportunity to 
criticize that is the very foundation of our democracy." Id. at 576. 
128 Id. at 575. 
120 See id. at 575 ("in administrative hearings, the rule of the 'open' forum is prevailing" 
(quoting Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1972))). The court also drew 
analogies to congressional sessions and civil trials, whose long traditions of public access 
suggested that administrative hearings should also be open. See id. at 575-76. 
130 Id. at 576. Specifically, the court noted that public access to hearings increases the 
probability that any mistakes will be quickly corrected, and helps to prevent an agency from 
abusing its power. 
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The test, however, has also been used to deny a right of access to vari-
ous executive branch records. Courts have rejected claims of access to ar-
rest records,l3l classified materials,132 and applications for liquor li-
censes.133 These rejections were all at least partly based on the lack of 
tradition of public access to such information. In Capital Cities Media, 
Inc. v. Chester,13' the Third Circuit implied that there was no right of 
access whatsoever to administrative materials.131i In dicta, the court sug-
gested that the government has historically limited access to executive 
branch records,136 indicating that such documents could never meet the 
"tradition" prong.137 Thus, in contrast with Society of Professional Jour-
nalists, Capital Cities Media appears to shut the door on access rights in 
the administrative sphere. 
In sum, it is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the scope of the 
right of access under the two-prong test. In every area where the test has 
been used to find a right of access, it has also been used to deny such a 
right. Courts have thus sent mixed signals on the test's potential to ex-
pand the right of access into areas beyond those already recognized by 
the Supreme Court. 
B. Application of the Balancing Test 
Some courts have not used the two-prong test in assessing claims of 
access rights, but instead have balanced the public's interest in obtaining 
particular information against the government's interest in refusing to 
provide it. One of the earliest, and most influential, of the balancing test 
131 See Herald Co. v. McNeal, 511 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1981). 
13' See McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (classified documents are 
"traditionally nonpublic government information"); see also American Library Ass'n v. 
Faurer, 631 F. Supp. 416, 421 (D.D.C. 1986) (no first amendment right to classified docu-
ments previously disclosed to the public where such disclosure could endanger national 
security). 
133 See Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 143 Ill. App. 3d 370, 493 N.E.2d 127 
(1986). 
13< 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986). 
13' Specifically, the court denied a claim of access to records of the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources hecause appellants had "neither pleaded nor offered to 
prove the existence of a tradition of public access to the type of administrative records here 
in dispute." Id. at 1175-76. 
138 See id. at 1170, 1172-73. A concurring opinion stated explicitly that "it is clear that 
there is no tradition of access to administrative agency records." Id. at 1177-78 (Adams, J., 
concurring). 
137 In dicta, the court also expressed the view that issues of access rights should be re-
solved by the legislature, not the courts. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing argument by Houchins plurality that access issue should be left to legislature). 
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cases was Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting COS.la8 In 
Cable News Network, a federal district court held that the first amend-
ment was violated by a Reagan administration policy that excluded the 
television media from "limited coverage" White House events.139 Al-
though the court mentioned historical tradition,140 it emphasized the im-
portance of a right of access in "informing the public at large of the work-
ings of government."141 The court concluded that the public's interest in 
access must be balanced against "limiting considerations such as confi-
dentiality, security, orderly process, spatial limitation, and doubtless 
many others."142 The court determined that, in this instance, the balance 
favored access.143 
Many courts have explicitly followed Cable News Network in finding a 
right of access to government-controlled information. In WPIX, Inc. v. 
League of Women Voters,144 a district court addressed the press's claim 
of a right of access to presidential debates. Relying on Cable News Net-
work, the court lIeld tlIat "[u]nder the first amendment, press organiza-
tions have a limited right of access to newsworthy events."141i The court 
then stated tlIat this interest in access had to be "balanced against the 
interest served by denial of that [newsgathering] activity."146 In Westing-
house Broadcasting v. National Transportation Safety Board,147 the 
court found that tlIe first amendment was violated by an order limiting 
press access at airplane crash sites.148 According to the court, Cable News 
Network indicated that the balancing test was the proper standard for 
assessing riglIt of access claims. The court concluded that access to the 
wreckage area was required unless the government could slIow some over-
riding consideration.149 
Like the two-prong test, the balancing test has also been used in the 
138 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
138 See id. at 1238, 1245. 
140 See id. at 1244. 
141 Id. at 1245. The court also pointed to the role of access in serving the first amend-
ment's core purpose of providing the public with information on governmental activities. 
See id. at 1241-44. 
142 Id. at 1244. 
143 See id . 
... 595 F. Supp. 1484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
14. Id. at 1489. 
148 Id. The court denied WPIX's request for an injunction that would allow it to cover the 
debate. Although the court found that WPIX's claims presented sufficiently serious ques-
tions to warrant judicial scrutiny, it denied the injunction because WPIX had failed to meet 
its burden of showing that an order granting it access was "necessary, fair and workable." 
Id. at 1493-95. 
147 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1177 (D. Mass. 1982). 
148 See id. at 1177, 1184. 
148 See id. at 1184. 
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criminal justice sphere to find rights of access not explicitly recognized by 
the Supreme Court. In In re Chase/50 the court recognized a right of ac-
cess to juvenile proceedings. The court found that the right of access was 
"vital to the core principles of the First Amendment,"151 but that this 
right was still subject to countervailing interests.152 Similarly, in United 
States v. Chagra,153 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the right of access to bail reduction hearings is not absolute 
but must instead be weighed against such governmental interests as the 
right to a fair trial and the need to preserve the confidentiality of sensi-
tive information. 1M Courts have also found a right of access to sentencing 
hearings,155 parole revocation hearings,156 and hearings on the release of 
convicted prisoners,157 unless there is a governmental interest sufficient to 
outweigh the public's interest in access. 
Outside the criminal context, the balancing test has been applied in a 
number of areas. Assessing a right of access claim to certain police 
records, the Wyoming Supreme Court, for example, weighed and evalu-
ated the legitimate competing interests.158 The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court used the balancing test to invalidate the impoundment of 
records in a public official's divorce proceeding.159 The court said that 
100 112 Misc. 2d 436, ,446 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Fam. Ct. 1982). 
'"' Id. at 1003. 
,.. See id. at 1004. The court found that the juvenile in Chase had failed to show an 
interest overcoming the presumption of openness. See id. at 1009. 
,.3 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983). 
,.. See id. at 364-65. 
, •• See United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afrd, 689 F.2d 21 
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983). 
, •• See Herald Co. v. Board of Parole, 131 Misc. 2d 36, 499 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1985). 
'.7 See Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983). 
10" See Sheridan Newspapers v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 795, 798 (Wyo. 1983). The 
Sheridan court largely took as its guide Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Hous-
ton, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. 1975), a pre-Richmond Newspapers case that had said that there 
was "a constitutional right of access to information concerning crime in the community, and 
to information relating to activities of law enforcement agencies." Id. at 186. In the Sheri-
dan case itself, the court found that the state's Public Records Act struck the proper bal-
ance between the right of access and governmental interests, and that because the denial of 
police records in the case was inconsistent with the statute, the denial violated both the law 
and the Constitution. See Sheridan, 660 P.2d at 795. For further discussion of the Sheridan 
case, see infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text. 
, •• George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate, 395 Mass. 274, 479 N.E.2d 
658 (1985). It should be noted that in this case the court did not explicitly ground the right 
of access in the Constitution. The court said that the access right was based on the "princi-
ple of publicity" recognized in Ottaway Newspapers v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 362 
N.E.2d 1189 (1977). See Prescott, 395 Mass. at 278, 479 N.E.2d at 662. This "principle of 
publicity" appears to be a hybrid common law/first amendment right. The reliance by the 
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although legitimate expectations of privacy would ordinarily justify im-
poundment, in this instance those expectations were outweighed by the 
public interest in learning "whether public servants are carrying out their 
duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner."l60 
Like the two-prong test, the balancing approach has been used to deny 
right of access claims as well as to uphold them. In Dean v. Guste,l6l the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal denied access to a school board executive ses-
sion on the ground that the government's interest in uninhibited debate 
among school board members outweighed the public interest in access to 
such sessions.l62 Similarly, a federal district court rejected a freelance 
photographer's claim that he had the "right" to photograph rock con-
certs.l63 Because the plaintiff was freely able to observe and comment on 
the concert, the court found, the incremental value of allowing him to 
photograph it was "negligible."l64 This minimal interest was outweighed 
by the considerable government interests in receiving revenue from con-
certs and protecting the property rights of performers.l65 
Although the balancing test, like the two-prong test, has been used 
both to expand and restrict the right of access to government-controlled 
information, the balancing test is generally more expansive than its two-
pronged counterpart. This wider coverage results from the balancing 
test's presumption of a right of access to government-controlled informa-
tion. The right attaches regardless of the particular proceeding's history 
of openness. As a result, the right can be denied only if it is outweighed 
by some governmental interest. The next section of this Note further ex-
amines the differences between the two tests and evaluates each test's 
standards. 
court, however, on a number of the Supreme Court's right of access cases indicates that the 
right has at least some constitutional dimensions . 
••• Prescott, 395 Mass. at 279, 479 N.E.2d at 662-63 (quoting Attorney General v. Collec-
tor of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 158,385 N.E.2d 505, 509 (1979». The public specifically had an 
interest in a deposition relating to allegations of misconduct by the party in his official 
capacity. See id. at 279, 479 N.E.2d at 662 . 
••• 414 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982). 
••• See id. at 865-66 . 
••• D'Amario v. Providence Civic Center Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538 (D.R.I. 1986) . 
• 1< See id. at 1543. 
••• See id. at 1543-44. 
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III. EVALUATION OF THE "RIGHT TO KNOW": AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
RIGHT OF ACCESS STANDARDS 
A. The Two-Prong Test 
1. The "Historical Tradition" Prong 
In deciding whether there is a historical tradition of access to particular 
infonnation, a court must determine what constitutes a sufficient tradi-
tion. This, in turn, generates a barrage of secondary questions. For exam-
ple, how old must the tradition be? Must it date back to English common 
law, or does a history of access in "modern" practice suffice? Similarly, 
how should a process of relatively recent origin, such as an administrative 
factrmding hearing, be handled? Should courts look at the process' own 
brief "history," analogize to older functionally similar processes, or simply 
declare that because there is no long tradition, there is also no right of 
access? Also, whose tradition should be considered? Do courts look at the 
tradition of the specific institution involved-that, for example, of the 
Department of Environmental Conservation? Or do they undertake a 
broader examination of the way the relevant type of information has his-
torically been addressed? 
The Supreme Court has provided few responses to such questions, and 
the answers it has given are themselves inconsistent. In Richmond News-
papers, for example, both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan 
made much of the fact that a tradition of access to trials existed at com-
mon law at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, implying that this 
was a condition that must be met to satisfy the tradition prong.166 In 
Press-Enterprise II, however, the Court recognized a right of access to 
pretrial proceedings, even though such proceedings had not been open at 
common law.167 
Inconsistency also appears in the Supreme Court's statements regard-
ing the perspective a court must adopt and the factors it should consider 
when determining whether a tradition of access exists. In Globe, the 
Court said that the right of access did not depend on the type of criminal 
trial involved, but rather on the tradition of access to criminal trials gen-
erally.16s As a result, many courts, including the California Supreme 
Court in Press-Enterprise II, denied access rights to any type of pretrial 
proceeding on the ground that the pretrial phase of criminal cases had 
generally been closed.160 When Press-Enterprise II came before the 
, •• See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-66 (1980); id. at 589-91 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
'.7 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2748 (1986). 
, •• See Glohe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982). 
, •• See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 772, 774-77, 691 P.2d 1026, 
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United States Supreme Court, however, the Court reversed the California 
court, and its earlier position, holding that there was a right of access to 
the type of preliminary hearings at issue.17o Lower courts thus cannot rely 
confidently on even the little guidance the Supreme Court has provided. 
The lack of clear direction is illustrated by the lower courts' widely va-
rying treatment of the tradition prong. For example, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has said that the 
tradition of access must be of considerable duration-"modern practice" 
is not sufficient.l7l Meanwhile, other courts have willingly examined the 
"modern" history of a proceeding when the proceeding itself is of rela-
tively recent origin.172 Some courts have analogized recent proceedings to 
older, functionally similar processes,173 while at least one judge has sug-
gested that a general tradition of press and public access to "newsworthy 
events" satisfies the tradition prong.l7' 
There are difficulties in determining what constitutes a sufficient his-
torical tradition of access, but there are even more serious problems with 
the "history" prong. First, the history test is inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court's established approach to first amendment adjudication. As 
some of the courts that have discounted the history test have noted, the 
Supreme Court has traditionally held that "the first amendment is to be 
interpreted in light of current values and conditions."17~ Indeed, this ap-
proach made the development of modern first amendment doctrine possi-
ble by freeing the Court from the historical assumption that the first 
1027-29, 209 Cal. Rptr. 360, 361-63 (1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986); In re Midland 
Publisbing Co., 420 Mich. 148, 164-75,362 N.W.2d 580, 589-94 (1984); see also Recent Case, 
supra note 80, at 318 (describing the California Supreme Court's rejection of a right of ac-
cess to pretrial proceedings as "nothing but faithful to the guidelines provided by the 
United States Supreme Court for determining the existence of access rights to judicial 
proceedings"). 
1,. See Press-Enterprise II, 106 S. Ct. at 2741-43. 
111 See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
112 See, e.g., First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 
(3d Cir. 1986); Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 
(D. Utah 1985). 
113 See, e.g., Society of Professional Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 575 (analogizing admin-
istrative factfinding bearings to congressional sessions and civil trials); see also First 
Amendment Coalition, 784 F.2d at 484-85 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (suggesting that judicial disciplinary proceedings be analogized to impeachment 
hearings). 
1,. See Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d 839, 846-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (Brett, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984). 
1,. See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-95 (1969»; United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 
(3d Cir. 1982) (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,386-95 (1969». 
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amendment was limited to preventing prior restraints on speech or publi-
cation.176 The Supreme Court has offered no explanation for diverging 
from this approach and treating the right of access differently from other 
fIrst amendment rights. 
There are also many practical reasons for assessing the right of access 
in terms of contemporary values and conditions. For example, many crim-
inal proceedings lack a common law tradition of openness but have grown 
so in importance under modern practice that closing them defeats the 
purpose of allowing access to trials.177 More generally, the size and power 
of many governmental institutions, particularly administrative agencies, 
have increased greatly in this century. As their power has increased, so 
has the public's need for access to information on their activities.178 Fi-
nally, basing the right of access on a history of openness rewards govern-
mental institutions that have stonewalled and gives others an incentive to 
follow suit.179 
Another major problem with the history prong is that there is no logical 
link between the history factor and the fIrst amendment rationale under-
lying the right of access.180 Right of access determinations should be 
based on the relevance of the information involved to the citizens' under-
standing of the functioning of their government. There is no reason to 
believe that traditional openness is a useful proxy for the information's 
capacity to promote self-governance.181 Indeed, information related to 
many of the most important public issues has historically been closed.182 
Thus, the tradition prong diverts judges from the real issue, the impor-
tance to self-government of the information in question, and forces them 
to delve into the arcane history and obscure facts of proceedings at com-
mon law.183 
"8 See BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspa-
pers, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 311, 328 n.115 (1982). 
177 See Chagra, 701 F.2d at 363; Criden, 675 F.2d at 555·57. 
178 See Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Government-Held Information: A 
Re·Evaluation After Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 292, 294 
(1982). 
17. See Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D. 
Utah 1985). 
180 See BeVier, supra note 176, at 326. 
181 Professor BeVier states that "[t]he connecting link between a claim of access and the 
first amendment's core purpose is not furnished by the coincidence of traditional openness 
... [but] by the connection between the facility or information to which access is requested 
and the functioning of government." rd. 
182 BeVier provides a good example: "Because prisons 'do not share the long tradition of 
openness' of trials, surely discussion of, and hence information about, prisons do not fall 
outside the amendment's core." Id. at 326 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 576 n.11 (1980». 
183 A particularly telling example is First Amendment Coalition, in which Judges Becker 
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Many courts have rejected the "tradition" prong on this basis. For ex-
ample, one court has said that even though parole revocation hearings 
were not traditionally open to the public, access to them is necessary, in 
that it enhances "free, open and informed discussion" of a process of 
great interest to the public.18' Similarly, courts have stated that access to 
pretrial proceedings should not be foreclosed by a lack of historical tradi-
tion, because access to such proceedings serves important "societal inter-
ests."185 A federal district court adopted this perspective regarding gov-
ernment information generally, stating that "to give proper weight to the 
policy implications involving the first amendment rights of access, it is 
appropriate for courts to go beyond ... historical analysis, [and deter-
mine] what information will [make] a positive contribution to the process 
of self-governance."I88 
Some courts have defended the history prong by stating that it is nec-
essary to limit the "theoretically endless" scope of the right of access.187 
Although limits are needed, it is apparent that historical tradition is an 
inappropriate limiting factor. If the history prong were applied as a strict 
threshold test, as the Supreme Court seems to imply it should be, it 
would act as an arbitrary criterion bearing no relationship to either the 
contribution of access to the process involved, or the role of the fIrst 
amendment in informing the public. If, on the other hand, it were applied 
with these considerations in mind, the history prong would have no sig-
nificance independent of the "function" prong. Worse yet, the history 
prong could be rendered so meaningless that every government denial of 
access to information would be subjected to strict scrutiny.188 
Other courts have found that the history prong is necessary to ensure 
that the right of access is supported by both experience and logic.189 This, 
and Adams disagreed over the percentage of judicial disciplinary proceedings that had been 
opened to the public. See First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 
F.2d 467, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring in part); id. at 481-82 (Adams, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I •• Herald Co. v. Board of Parole, 131 Misc. 2d 36, 46, 499 N.Y.S.2d 301, 308 (Sup. Ct. 
1985), modified and affd, 125 A.D.2d 985, 510 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1986). 
I.' See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1982). 
18. In re Consumer Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 53-54 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (quoting 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring». 
187 See, e.g., First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 
473-74 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1332 
(D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 1984) (MacMahon, J., 
dissenting). 
I •• It is this possibility that evidently troubled Justice Stevens in his Press-Enterprise II 
dissent. See supra note 102. 
'.8 See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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however, does not justify treating tradition as an inflexible threshold re-
quirement for a right of access. Such a test would "fossilize" the first 
amendment/so and would make the right of access much more restricted 
than other first amendment rights.l91 The goal of conforming the right of 
access to the lessons of experience can be met by treating historical tradi-
tion as a factor to be weighed in assessing right of access claims.IS2 Due 
consideration is then given to historical practice without letting the lack 
of a tradition of openness foreclose access that either contributes to the 
process' functioning or provides information to the public that is relevant 
to self-governance. This flexible approach is superior to treating history 
as a rigid threshold test, which unduly emphasizes experience at the ex-
pense of logic. 
2. The "Contribution to Function" Prong 
As with the "tradition of openness" test, the courts have inconsistently 
applied the "contribution to function" prong. Treating the test strin-
gently, some courts have demanded that access contribute to the func-
tioning of the process in question.ls3 Other courts have more generally 
examined the public's interest in receiving information on the process in-
volved.ls4 In United States v. DeLorean/slS a federal district court ruled 
that pretrial documents could be sealed because access to them would not 
II. Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d at 1347 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
111 See id. at 1353 ("Few constitutional rights that we now take for granted would survive 
this brittle test."). 
lIZ See BeVier, supra note 176, at 327: 
[T]be history of openness . . . might well be considered pertinent in calculating the 
weight to be accorded the government's interest in denying access in a particular 
case. For example, to the extent that experience has demonstrated that openness is 
ordinarily compatible with the proper and regular performance of the particular gov-
ernmental activity, it might be more difficult for the government to demonstrate its 
substantial or compelling interests in denying access. Conversely, a history of restric-
tions on access, of confidentiality, or of secrecy might permit the more ready infer-
ence that access would materially disrupt important functions and thus help the gov-
ernment to justify a particular access restriction. 
Id. at 327; see also Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1189-90 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (tra-
dition merely "relevant" to the decision on access); Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d at 1347 
(Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (historical tradition just one factor to 
be weighed in ruling on access). 
'"' See, e.g., Seattle Times v. Eberharter, 105 Wash. 2d 144, 153, 713 P.2d 710, 714 (1986) 
("[B]ecause of the role of the probable cause determination in the judicial process, immedi-
ate public access is not required for the effective functioning of the process itself."). 
'" See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983). 
II. 561 F. Supp. 797 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
1987] Right to Know 1135 
enhance the functioning of the criminal proceeding.I9s Vacating the seal-
ing order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took 
a broader view of the "contribution to function" prong, and found that it 
was enough that access would contribute to a full understanding of both 
the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole.197 
The proper approach to the function prong was also a source of disa-
greement in In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. I9S 
Judge Wright's opinion, in which he dissented in part, stressed the public 
interest in obtaining information on governmental proceedings and found 
that such an interest required contemporaneous access to pretrial docu-
ments.I99 Judge Scalia's majority opinion said that the dissent was "mis-
taken in assuming that the public interest in obtaining news is the focus 
of inquiry in right-of-access cases .... [Rather], the focus is upon the 
public's ability to assure proper functioning of the courts. Contemporane-
ity of access to written material does not significantly enhance that 
ability. "200 
The inconsistent treatment of the function prong stems not merely 
from the lack of guidance provided to courts in applying that test, but 
also from the sense of many courts that looking exclusively at the effect 
of access on the immediate process improperly narrows the judicial in-
quiry. The enhancement of the quality of the process in question is just 
one of the many societal values that are furthered by access.20I Like the 
tradition prong, the "contribution to function" prong, narrowly con-
strued, bears little relation to the underlying political rationale of the 
first amendment.202 There are numerous instances in which access could 
provide information useful to self-governance without also directly im-
proving the functioning of the process involved. For example, although 
public access to legislative proceedings might not improve the quality of 
debate/OS it nonetheless increases public understanding of the issues 
before the legislature and the process by which that body works. Thus, 
It. Id. at 800-01. The court expressed its doubt that public access to documents would 
enbance the quality of a criminal trial that itself was completely open to public scrutiny and 
criticism, and "when, in almost every instance, all facts and arguments contained in the 
documents, if relevant and probative of the particular issue at hand, will necessarily stand 
revealed at the in-court proceeding." Id. 
Jt1 See Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145, 1147 (9tb Cir. 
1983). 
II. 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
III See id. at 1352-53 (Wrigbt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
2.. Id. at 1337 n.9. 
2.1 See In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 54 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
2.2 See BeVier, supra note 176, at 336-37. 
2., Public access to legislative proceedings may actually reduce the efficiency of debates 
and hearings by encouraging grandstanding. 
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the "function" prong overemphasizes the effects of access on specific 
processes, when what is important is its more general effect on increasing 
citizens' understanding of the issues they must decide, and of the work-
ings of the government they must control. 
In sum, analysis of the two-prong test reveals that it is seriously flawed. 
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance to other courts applying 
the "tradition" prong, which has resulted in their putting the test to di-
verse and conflicting uses. More importantly, the historical tradition test 
fails to follow the established Supreme Court approach of interpreting 
first amendment issues in light of current values and conditions, thus cre-
ating a variety of practical problems. Finally, both the "tradition" and 
"contribution to function" prongs act as arbitrary criteria that have little 
to do with the underlying rationale of the right of access, and that often 
undermine its purpose. 
B. Assessing the "Balancing" Test 
The balancing test avoids many of the problems associated with the 
two-prong test. First, the balancing test is consistent with general first 
amendment jurisprudence in that it takes into account contemporary val-
ues and conditions.204 Second, it allows courts to grant access to proceed-
ings lacking a history of openness when the importance of the proceeding 
has increased in recent years.205 Third, it avoids rewarding governmental 
bodies that close their proceedings206 by allowing courts to look beyond 
the pattern of closure to determine if there is a sufficient rationale justi-
fying it. 
The balancing test also marks an improvement over the contribution to 
function prong. Like the function prong, the balancing test takes into ac-
count the effect of public access on the process in question.207 The bal-
ancing test, however, does not limit a court's consideration to the effect of 
the access on the process itself.208 It instead allows a court to consider a 
whole range of benefits and costs of access. 
'04 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
'05 See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) (bail reduction 
hearings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555-57 (3d Cir. 1982) (pretrial supression, 
due process, and entrapment hearings). 
'06 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
'07 For example, just as courts have denied access to grand jury records because openness 
might frustrate the functioning of the process, see, e.g., In re Secretary of Labor Donovan, 
No. 81-2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file), so too could courts 
use the balancing test to conclude that the impairment of the process outweighed the inter-
est in access. 
'08 See supra text accompanying notes 201-03 (alternative benefits of access). 
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One benefit that the balancing test allows courts to consider is the pub-
lic interest in the particular proceeding or information at issue. For exam-
ple, although there is generally no tradition of access to records in divorce 
proceedings, a Massachusetts court found an access right to those records 
that were relevant to allegations of a public official's misconduct.209 The 
public's interest in learning about the official's inappropriate behavior 
was found to outweigh both the lack of a tradition of openness and the 
public official's privacy concerns.21O The balancing test can grant greater 
weight to those access claims in which the information involved is directly 
related to a major public issue or is a matter seriously affecting the opera-
tion of the government. 
The balancing test properly focuses the reviewing court's inquiry on the 
political rationale of the right of access. Under the balancing test, the 
limiting variable on the "theoretically limitless" right of access is not an 
arbitrary factor like historical tradition, but rather the information's rele-
vance to public debate and self-governance. If the information involved 
would do little to enhance public understanding of the workings of gov-
ernment or of an important public issue, then the government's counter-
vailing interest in limiting access need not be very strong. If, on the other 
hand, the information does bear on the citizenry's ability to make in-
formed political decisions, then a strong governmental interest is needed 
to offset the right of access. 
There is, however, a drawback to the balancing approach. As courts 
balance the public interest in access against countervailing governmental 
interests, they become involved in what many regard as policy determina-
tions. It has been argued that such political decisions should be made not 
by the judiciary, but rather by the legislature.21l Indeed, in Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc., a plurality of the Supreme Court noted that making deci-
sions on public access to governmental information was "clearly a legisla-
tive task."212 Drawing extensively from an article written by Justice Stew-
art,213 they declared that the public interest in access to government-
controlled information was protected not by the Constitution, but by the 
'0. George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate, 395 Mass. 274, 479 N.E.2d 
658 (1985). 
210 Id. at 278, 281·82, 479 N.E.2d at 662, 664. 
211 See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1171-73 (3d Cir. 1986); 
First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 474·75 (3d Cir. 
1986); Herald Co. v. McNeal, 511 F. Supp. 269, 273 (E.D. Mo. 1981). 
212 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978). The plurality opinion was written by 
Chief Justice Burger, who was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. For a discussion of 
Houchins, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text . 
... See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 
631 (1975». Interestingly, Justice Stewart did not join Chief Justice Burger's opinion, and, 
in his own concurrence, he did not raise the "leave it to the legislature" argument. See id. at 
16-19 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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political process.214 They indicated that instead of turning to the courts to 
obtain a right of access, the public should secure that right through legis-
lative enactments.21II Although the Houchins approach bas never been 
adopted by a majority of the Court, it has been relied on by a number of 
other COurts.216 
Some courts have questioned whetber the public interest in access can 
be protected through the political process. In Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, the district court stated that the demo-
cratic process cannot ensure that the right of access is protected because 
openness itself is essential to the proper functioning of tbat process.217 
Majoritarian pressure for openness cannot arise if people are unaware of 
or misled about the abuses or mistakes going on bebind closed doors.218 In 
addition, the court noted tbat the right of access is a procedural right and 
not a substantive one, and U[p]rocedural rights are less susceptible to pro-
tection by majoritarian pressures.''219 Thus, the court concluded, the leg-
islature cannot be relied upon to protect tbe right of access. 
These arguments are rendered less compelling by tbe fact that 
"majoritarian pressures" have led legislatures to pass laws providing ac-
cess to government information. On the federal level, Congress has passed 
three significant statutes that direct the release of government-held infor-
mation. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1967220 requires that 
the executive branch positively respond to requests for information unless 
the information falls within one of nine exemptions. The Privacy Act of 
1974221 provides individuals with access to information about themselves 
... See id. at 15-16. 
m See id. at 12-15. This idea was elaborated on by Professor BeVier in an article pub-
lished two years after Houchins. See BeVier, supra note 13. In this article, BeVier argued 
that "the people do not have the constitutional right to demand through the courts that 
their representatives choose to disclose information, which is what the recognition of a right 
to know would give them." Id. at 509. Rather, they "have the constitutional right to affect 
the choices that their representatives make on the issue of public disclosure," by exercising 
the franchise, bringing political pressure to bear on the resolution of the issue, and holding 
their representatives accountable when the cl10ices they make are politically unacceptable. 
Id. 
218 See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1173-74 (3d Cir. 1986); 
First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 474 (3d Cir. 
1986). . 
.17 See Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D. 
Utah 1985). 
'18 See id . 
• 19 Id. 
,2. Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54, 54-56 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 
& Supp. III 1985». 
2.1 Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1896, 1897-1905 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 
552a (1982 & Supp. III 1985». 
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that is held by the government. The Government in the Sunshine Act of 
1976222 requires that certain agencies open their meetings to the public, 
except in circumstances that closely parallel the FOIA exemptions. Simi-
lar developments have taken place at the state level. Today, every state 
has both an "open records" law223 and a "sunshine" law.224 These laws 
suggest that legislatures have been responsive to public demands for ac-
cess to government-controlled information. 
These statutes, however, do not adequately protect the public interest 
in access to government information. A wide range of the information 
that might be requested by the public from the federal government, for 
instance, falls within the exemptions set out in the federal Freedom of 
Information Act.m The exemption for material relating to national secur-
ity, for example, has been implemented through a classification system 
that allows the government to prevent public access to virtually any in-
formation pertaining to national defense or foreign relations.226 Similarly, 
the exemption for inter- and intra-agency memoranda could potentially 
bar access to nearly everything an agency puts in writing.227 Although 
courts have generally construed the exemption narrowly,228 this has not 
stopped the government from turning to it repeatedly to support its de-
nial of requests for information.229 The scope of information available 
may further contract: Congress has recently expanded the exemption for 
law enforcement records230 and has considered several other proposals to 
limit access under FOIA.231 Moreover, FOIA's procedure for obtaining in-
formation has become so costly and difficult that "[it] may become use-
less for all but the most patient and the best-financed citizens."232 The 
••• Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241, 1241-46 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982» . 
• ,. See B. Braverman & F. Chetwynd, Information Law 895, 1113-17 (1985). 
, .. See Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 
Ark. L. Rev. 268, 268 (1984) . 
• ,. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) . 
• ,. See Note, supra note 178, at 300 n.60 . 
... See Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency 
Memoranda, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1047, 1048-49 (1973) . 
• ,. See id. at 1049-63. 
". See id.; see also Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Informa-
tion Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 153 (1976) (government has used exemptions as "am-
munition" when resisting discovery). 
, •• See Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1801-1804, 1986 U.S. Code Congo & 
Admin. News (100 Stat.) 3207,3207-48 to 3207-50. 
'" See, e.g., H.R. 4862, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Congo Rec. H7876-77 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 
1986); S. 774, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Congo Rec. S1794-97 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). 
u, Vaughn, Our Government Stymies Open Government, Wash. Post, July 1, 1984, at C1, 
col. 4; see also Gordon & Heinz, The Continuing Struggle over Citizen Access to Govern-
ment Information, in Public Access to Information XX (A. Gordon & J. Heinz eds. 1979) 
(persons seeking access are discouraged by the extensive time and resources necessary to 
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federal "Sunshine Act" provides only limited protection, in that it applies 
only to meetings among members of agencies headed by collegial bod-
ies.233 This leaves out proceedings of agencies with a single head234 as well 
as a number of adjudicatory235 and factfinding236 proceedings of covered 
agencies. 
Meanwhile, most state laws are even less effective than their federal 
counterparts. State open records laws vary widely in the scope of infor-
mation covered,237 and virtually all open records and open meetings laws 
contain broad exemptions.238 Under this statutory framework, the public 
continues to be denied access to important governmental information in a 
variety of contexts. 
Beyond the deficiencies in present freedom of information laws, there 
are inherent problems with leaving protection of the right of access exclu-
sively to the legislative and executive branches. First, this would prevent 
the courts from checking any self-protective tendency of bureaucrats and 
legislators to withhold information on their activities from public scru-
tiny.239 More importantly, as Judge Gibbons noted in his dissent in Capi-
tal Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, there is something fundamentally dis-
turbing about "a model of government in which elected executive or 
legislative branch officials are deemed to have been delegated the power 
enforce their rights). 
233 See B. Braverman & F. Chetwynd, supra note 223, at 838. For a list of bodies covered 
by the Sunshine Act, see id. at 1097-99. 
23< See id. at 841-42. 
23. See, e.g., Hunt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 611 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(finding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board not a subdivision of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and consequently ruling that Sunshine Act did not prohibit Board from hold-
ing in camera hearings in connection with power plant building application), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 906 (1980). 
238 See, e.g., Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 
(D. Utah 1985) (basing right of access to Mine Safety and Health Administration accident 
hearings directly on first amendment, implying no claim existed under Sunshine Act). 
237 See generally Comment, Public Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Docu-
ments: "Everybody, Practically Everything, Anytime, Except ... ," 45 Fordham L. Rev. 
1105, 1112-14 (1977) (discussing varying definitions of "public record" in state open records 
laws). For a recent treatment of state open records laws, see B. Braverman & F. Chetwynd, 
supra note 223, at 895-919. 
238 See W. Francois, supra note 17, at 151-53; Stein, The Secrets of Local Government, in 
None of Your Business 153 (N. Dorsen & S. Gillers eds. 1974). For an update on exemptions 
under state open records laws, see B. Braverman & F. Chetwynd, supra note 223, at 919-34. 
231 See W. Small, Political Power and the Press 394 (1972) (noting a Congressional Quar-
terly study showing that 37% of congressional committee meetings were held in secret exec-
utive sessions); see also Gore, Legislative Secrecy, in None of Your Business 140-45 (N. 
Dorsen & S. Gillers eds., 1974) (accounts of secret executive session and secret conference 
committee meetings); Note, supra note 178, at 300-03 (examples of officials' tendency 
toward secrecy). 
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to decide for us what we need to knoW."240 According to Judge Gibbons, 
this " 'big brother' approach . . . carries with it the seeds of destruction 
of participatory democracy, for it places in the hands of those chosen for 
positions of authority the power to withhold from those to whom they 
should be accountable the very information upon which informed voting 
should be based."241 It is therefore unwise to exclude the judiciary from 
playing any role in the protection of the right of access. 
Fortunately, there are less drastic means of dealing with the problem of 
judicial policymaking under the balancing test. Courts could take an ap-
proach similar to that developed by the Supreme Court in the area of 
commercial speech. Although commercial speech is protected by the first 
amendment, the Court has held that legislatures should be given more 
leeway in regulat.ing commercial speech than they are given in regulating 
other forms of speeech.242 Similarly, courts could recognize access to gov-
ernment-controlled information as a protected right but defer to legisla-
tive regulation of access as long as that regulation reasonably balanced 
the public's interest in access against the government's countervailing in-
terests in closure. Where the legislature had not established any policy on 
access-as is widely true in many contexts today-the courts would step 
in to apply the balancing test themselves.243 
At least one court has already adopted such an approach to the right of 
access. In Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan,244 the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court found a constitutional right of access but noted that 
this right could be "conditioned" by statutory restrictions.245 The court 
stated that "the legislature [has] authority to promulgate ... such statu-
tory restraints upon the news-gathering business as will best serve the 
public good."246 The court nonetheless warned that such restraints could 
not "unlawfully deny the people's right to be informed."247 
This sort of approach restrains undue judicial intrusion into the policy 
realm by leaving the primary responsibility of policy balancing to the leg-
islature. It allows the judiciary, however, to serve as a check on the legis-
... Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1186 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting). 
24\ Id. 
242 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 
447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980) (regulation of commercial speech must meet a "substantial in-
terest" standard that is lower than the usual strict scrutiny test) . 
... Cf. Note, supra note 178, at 343-48 (suggesting scheme of "coordinate implementa-
tion" of the right of access by the legislative and judicial branches) . 
... 660 P.2d 785 (Wyo. 1983). 
... See id. at 795. 
... Id . 
... Id. 
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lature, reviewing legislative regulation of access to ensure that the consti-
tutional interest of the public is accorded its due weight in the balancing 
process, and stepping in to protect the right where the legislature has 
failed to address the issue at all. In this way, courts can ensure that, in all 
situations, the proper protection will be given to the people's "right to 
know." 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The right of access to government-controlled information is a vital cor-
ollary of the political purpose of the first amendment. Without some pro-
tection for access to governmental information, the first amendment can-
not fulfIll its role of ensuring an informed citizenry. In Richmond 
Newspapers, the Supreme Court finally took its first step in recognizing 
this right of access by holding that the public had a first amendment 
right to attend criminal trials. 
Since Richmond Newspapers, two major "right of access" standards 
have emerged. In a series of cases following Richmond, the Supreme 
Court has fashioned a "two-prong" test which grants access only where 
there is a "tradition of openness" to the information in question, and 
where access contributes to the functioning of the particular process in-
volved. The Court's decisions have also spurred the development of a bal-
ancing test under which the reviewing court weighs the interest in access 
against the government's interests in secrecy. Using these two standards, 
state and lower federal courts have extended the right of access to a vari-
ety of proceedings and information not yet addressed in decisions of the 
Supreme Court. 
The two-prong test is fundamentally flawed, for it both abandons the 
Court's established approach to first amendment adjudication and bears 
little or no relation to the underlying purpose of the right of access. The 
balancing test is superior, in that it correctly focuses the inquiry on the 
political role of the right of access. This standard, however, creates a 
greater risk of judicial policymaking, leading some commentators to con-
clude that right of access decisions should be left exclusively to the legis-
lative and executive branches. This solution is too extreme, because it 
leaves elected officials unchecked in their discretion to withhold informa-
tion from those citizens to whom they should be accountable. This Note 
instead proposes that courts recognize access to governmental informa-
tion as a protected right, but then defer to the legislature's balancing of 
that right against countervailing government interests, unless the result 
unreasonably impairs the political objective of the right of access. This 
would allow each branch to act on its strengths in shaping a right to know 
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that protects the underpinnings of American democracy without impair-
ing the ability of that democracy to operate effectively. 
Michael J. Hayes 
